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A Response to Sherk: Chagrin Without Despair and
Hope Without Presumption
William A. Donaher*
I
The development of the judicial concept of strict product liability as a general principle of law, from its early but elaborate suggestion in Justice Traynor's concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca
Cola Bottling,' (a manufacturing defect case) to its fulfillment in
Justice Traynor's opinion for the California Supreme Court in
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,2 (a design defect case)
gave every promise of this Garden of Eden having come fully
equipped with lurking serpent. The linking, within a single legal
concept, of two such disparate subject matters as the production
defect and the design defect overlooked the critical differences between these two classifications of cases and the necessity of recognizing that the tests to be applied for the purpose of determining
whether a manufacturing defect existed, giving rise to imposition
of strict liability, cannot be transposed for application in a design
defect case.
Although evidentiary problems may prove difficult in a production defect case, the elements of the cause of action are simplicity
itself. The crucial question of defect is addressed by the expedient
of determining whether the injury-causing product did or did not
conform to a definite norm (such as the manufacturer's in-house
specifications, industry wide standards, or a universal performance
expectation), followed by resolution of the question of whether the
identified defect was causitive of the injury. Determination of the
question of the presence of defect in a design defect case admits of
no such easy testing procedure. In the design arena, the design is
tested against a societal norm which the jury constructs out of a
multiplicity of conflicting considerations which themselves shift in
* A.B., 1949, Catholic University of America; LL. B., 1952, Harvard University. Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law.
1. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
2. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
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the importance accorded them, on a case by case basis. Employment of the familiar Wade3 criteria indicates the variations, and
the viariables therein, which come into play whenever any product,
even the least complicated, is under examination in the context of
design defect litigation. In short, the only thing common to the
production defect area and the design defect area is the ultimate
step, i.e., imposition of liability without proof of defendant-manufacturer's fault.
However, the spill-over of language and concepts from production defect cases into design defect cases has, by virtue of this odd
juxtaposition, resulted in some misleading and confusing results.
The premier example of this spill-over effect is found in Cronin v.
J.B.E. Olson Corp.,4 a production defect case of simple character
in which the California Supreme Court states that the concept of
"defect" need not be illumined by considerations of "unreasonable
danger," and goes on to note, gratuitously and disastrously, that
"we can see no difficulty in applying the Greenman formulation to
the full range of products liability situations, including those involving "design defects." A defect may emerge from the mind of
'5
the designer as well as from the hand of the workman."
The short term consequences are discernable in the confusion of
the New Jersey' courts. The medium term effects are to be observed in the perplexity of the California7 trial courts' and the in3. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 83738 (1973):
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product-its utility to the user and to
the public as a whole.
(2) The safety aspects of the product-the likelihood that it will cause injury,
and the probable seriousness of the injury.
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the same need and
not be as unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe characater of the product
without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its utility.
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of the
product.
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and
their avoidability, because of general public knowledge of the obvious condition of the
product, or of the existence of suitable warnings or instructions.
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss by
setting the price of the product or carrying liability insurance.
Id. (footnote omitted).
4. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
5. Id. at 134, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
6. See Glass v. Ford Motor Co., 123 N.J. Super. 599, 304 A.2d 562 (1973).
7. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 417, 573 P.2d 443, 446, 143 Cal. Rptr.
225, 228 (1978).
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termediate appellate courts' bewilderment. But the long-term invalid would seem to be Pennsylvania."
The absurd insistence that a word of art such as "defect" is adequate to enlighten the fact-finding jury of the scope of their function was happily abandoned, if somewhat disingenuously, as early
as 1978, in Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.," by the culprit California Supreme Court. If their ludicrous assertion that it is difficult to
understand why Cronin caused confusion' 0 may contribute to the
merriment of the age, their inapposite suggestion that a test of
"excessive preventable danger""' is a less obnoxious guide than the
term "unreasonable danger"' 2 compels our conclusion that novelty
is the pearl without price in the jurisprudence of California. Certainly the suspicion must have been entertained by others than
myself that although the word "unreasonable" does not compel the
mind to an orientation of negligence, the term "excessive preventable" inescapably evokes a consideration of manufacturer's attitude.
"Preventable" by whom? In short, the misguided attempt by the
California Supreme Court to avoid a wholely imagined confusion of
the principles of negligence and strict liability has degenerated
into a cosmetic exercise as mystifying as it is pretentious.
For the vast majority of courts, the dilemma was avoided. For
the New Jersey courts, it has been overcome.'" For Pennsylvania,
alas, the error not only persists,' but has spawned a frightening
progeny.' 5 Ironically, it was some months after the California Supreme Court had, in Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.,'" "interpreted" the guts out of the Cronin decision that the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court resoundingly reaffirmed the position it had earlier
taken in Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp.,' 7 in its decision in
Azzarello v. Black Brothers.'8 The Azzarello opinion relied heavily
8. See Sherk v. Daisy-Heddon, 450 A.2d 615 (Pa. 1982); Azzarello v. Black Bros., 480
Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978); Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d
893 (1975).
9. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
10. Id. at 429, 573 P.2d at 453, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 235.
11. Id. at 430, 573 P.2d at 454, 143 Cal. Rtpr. at 236.
12. Id at 423, 573 P.2d at 450, 143 Cal. Rtpr. at 232.
13. Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978).
14. Azzarello v. Black Bros., 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978).
15. Sherk v. Daisy-Heddon, 450 A.2d 615 (Pa. 1982).
16. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
17. 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975).
18. 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978). The.Pennsylvania Supreme Court responded, it
may be supposed, to the federal courts' unwillingness, in Beron v. Kramer-Trenton Co., 402
F. Supp. 1268 (E.D. Pa. 1975), affd, 538 F.2d 318 (3d Cir. 1976) to apply the Berkebile

920

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 21:917

upon the already repudiated Cronin position, in enunciating a
Pennsylvania rule that extraordinarily combines within itself the
wholely disparate elements of negligence law and absolute liability
law. The operative language of Azzarello reads:
For the term guarantor to have any meaning in this context the supplier
must at least provide a product which is designed to make it safe for the
intended use. Under this standard, in this type case, the jury may find a
defect where the product left the supplier's control lacking any element necessary to make it safe for its intended use or possessing any feature that
renders it unsafe for the intended use."

The juxtaposition of the negligence language of "intended use,"
inescapably reflecting manufacturer's establishment of a parameter
of liaiblity for itself as well as introducing as a relevant issue manufacturer's conduct, or attitude assumed during the design process,
with the absolute liability language of "guarantor," "lacking any
element necessary to make it safe," and "possessing any feature
that renders it unsafe, 20 creates a dilemma of unimagined magnitude for those charged with interpreting the Pennsylvania rule. For
trial courts, intermediate appellate courts, and lawyers engaged in
counseling clients as well as litigating products liability cases, did
the absence of any qualifying language addressed to the balancing
of risk and utility considerations suggest, or even compel, the conclusion that the Court was opting for an absolute liability rule?
And, concurrently, was the court, in employing language of "intended use," suggesting a vast enlargement of the misuse defense,
which would mark a further divison between the Pennsylvania approach in products liability law and the direction taken by nearly
every other jurisdiction? For nearly four years there was no response to either question from the court. In August, 1982, there
was delivered an answer,I arguably somewhat tentative,2 2 to the
second question, but it was an answer that made the previous pelanguage. That unwillingness found its justification in the fact that only two of the seven
participating justices of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court joined in the court's opinion, although all seven concurred in the result. Since the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had previously held, in Commonwealth v. Silverman, 422 Pa. 211, 218 n.8, 275 A.2d 308, 312 n.8
(1971) and Commonwealth v. Little, 432 Pa. 256, 260, 248 A.2d 32, 35 (1968), that opinions
of their court which had been joined by less than a majority of participating justices lacked
precedential effect, the view of the federal courts can be appreciated.
19. 480 Pa. at 559, 391 A.2d at 1027 (footnote omitted).
20. Id. (emphasis added).
21. Sherk v. Daisy-Heddon, 450 A.2d 615 (Pa. 1982).
22. Of the six participating justices, only three joined in the plurality opinion. See
supra note 18.
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riod of suspense look attractive by comparison.
In Sherk v. Daisy-Heddon,3 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
considered questions of whether actions in negligence, warranty,
strict liability in tort (under section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts)" ' or misrepresentation (under section 402B of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts)2 5 would lie. For three of the participating six members of the court, an alleged misuse of the allegedly defective product by an additional party defendant, sufficed
to shield the defendant-manufacturer from liability, with a fourth
member of the court joining in the conclusion, if not the opinion,
of the other three. Justice Larsen filed a dissenting opinion, in
which the then Chief Justice joined.
The events leading to infliction of a mortal injury through use of
the allegedly defective product are as follows. A fourteen year old
boy persuaded his parents to permit him to purchase, through
mail-order, a "Power King" pump-up air rifle manufactured by the
Daisy-Heddon Company. The Power King was delivered in a box
bearing the Daisy logo, a "bull's eye" target, and accompanied by
certain warnings and instructions. The reader was instructed that
the Power-King was much more powerful than the traditional
Daisy BB gun and was warned not to point the gun at anyone.
There was, however, a complete absence of any warning, in the material accompanying the gun or in the mail-order catalogue materials or advertisements for the gun, that this particular model of the
Daisy air rifle was the first Daisy gun which could, and would, kill
human beings if it were pumped up to a high level. A few days
after receiving the gun, the boy-purchaser, at play with a fourteen
year old friend, unintentionally shot his friend in the head with a
BB from the Power King. The BB passed through the friend's
skull and penetrated five inches into the boy's brain, killing him.2 6
The administratrix of the estate of the deceased child instituted
the instant law suit against Daisy, the manufacturer of Power
King, predicating her claim upon strict liability grounds of defectiveness of the gun due to absence of adequate warnings and the
negligence of the defendant-manufacturer in its manufacture, promotion and marketing of this lethal weapon under the "Daisy"
logo, a logo long recognized as associated with a toy.
Inasmuch as the plurality opinion rests entirely upon the pro23.

24.
25.
26.

450 A.2d 615 (Pa. 1982).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 A (1965).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 B (1965).
450 A.2d at 622 (Larsen, J., dissenting).

Duquesne Law Review

922

Vol. 21:917

position that the child firing the Power King "is exclusively responsible for the consequences of his misuse ' 27 this commentary
shall be addressed to the narrow grounds for the decision enunciated in the plurality opinion and to certain points raised in the
dissent.2 8
The scholarly and comprehensive treatment of the issues of negligence law and causation which constitute a major portion of Justice Larsen's dissent lie outside the purview of this commentary.
However important, indeed vital, the dissenter's observations are
in these areas, the focus of my consideration is upon the long range
implications arising from the plurality opinion and the delightfully
enlightening perceptions about product liability set forth by the
dissenting justice.
II
Not surprisingly, the author of the plurality opinion labors to
assign to the purchaser-actor a degree of perception regarding the
dangerous propensities of the Power King which argues for assigning to that child the sole legal responsibility for the tragic end
result.29 It is noted that the boy knew that BBs fired from the
Power King could shatter glass bottles and pierce tin cans, that it
was "some[what more] powerful than the spring BB guns he had
previously used,"' 0 that a BB fired from a Power King could blind
a person and that the gun should never be aimed at anyone. The
boy's testimony that he hoped to use the gun to kill rabbits and
rats is also recited."' The only unambiguous conclusion to be
drawn from this summary of testimony is that the Power King was
perceived to be a bigger and better model of the familiar BB gun;
the suggestion that the Power King was perceived, or would be
likely to be perceived as a potential killer of human beings is completely unsupported by any evidence presented at trial. Indeed, it
is virtually certain from an observation of the warning-instructional materials2 that Daisy was trying to enjoy the best of two
worlds in appealing to its established clientele that the Power King
was a new improved model of the familiar Daisy BB gun, without
committing itself to the statement that it was a death-dealing
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at

618 (emphasis added).
622 (Larsen, J., dissenting).
617-18.
618 (emphasis added).
618 (emphasis added).
619 n.5.
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weapon." The evidence of its own Director of Product Evaluation
and Director of Research and Development" establishes that
Daisy was branching out into previously untouched territory, while
its warning-instruction materials" belies any claim that Daisy's new
venture was being carried out in a candid fashion. On the record,
as referred to in the plurality opinion, it is not only implausible to
assert that the child firing the BB gun had any inkling of the potential for serious injury which might result from the act; it is absurd to so argue. Misuse of the product there certainly was, but
such a determination does not, can not, conclude the exercise of
resolving a complex legal question. Two questions remain: (1) Can
Daisy be viewed as responsible for the misuse; and (2) Did Daisy
have an obligation to design (in this instance by using a different
logo for the Power King, and explicitly warning of the life-taking
potential of this weapon) for possible misuse? If either question is
responded to affirmatively, then Daisy is not simply equally culpable with the boy who pulled the trigger; Daisy is exclusively responsible for the tragic event.
As to whether Daisy lulled the boy who pulled the trigger into a
state of complacency by marketing the gun as simply a "much
more powerful type gun than the traditional Daisy spring-air BB
gun,
certainly a jury question is presented. It is difficult, if not
impossible, to conclude that the above complacent kind of wording, especially when coupled with the marketing of the gun under
the Daisy logo, would as a matter of law alert the user of the gun
to its lethal potential. Rather, particularly in light of the very explicit concern voiced by Daisy's Director of Product Evaluation,3 7
but ignored by Daisy in marketing the gun, a stronger case is made
for concluding, as a matter of law, that Daisy had encouraged, in
the minds of the users of the Power King, an attitude bordering on
the cavalier. If so, the plurality opinion exalts to conclusive importance a "misuse" which, at the very least, was to be anticipated,
and in fact insulates the manufacturer from the consequences of
its own intentional activity.
Under the nearly universally applied standard 8 for determining
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
419 U.S.

Id. at 623 (Larsen, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 619 n.5.
Id.
Id. at 623 (Larsen, J., dissenting).
Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
869 (1974).
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defectiveness in the warning area of product design, Daisy labored
under a burden little, if at all, more onorous than it would be required to meet when the complaint sounds in negligence. Daisy
was required to warn against, in an adequate fashion, dangers
which it did perceive or should have perceived. Daisy's perception
cannot be at issue.39 The only question remaining is addressed to
the adequacy of the warning.
It is here that the dissent furnishes new insight regarding both
the instant case and the whole approach to product liability. More
than one forest has been sacrificed in the payment of tribute to the
proposition that it is the product which is the pivotal point in
strict product liability litigation, but almost inevitably that observation is closely followed by a discussion of what the manufacturer
should have done, or would have been obliged to do if knowledge
had been possessed by it. 40 If in fact the manufacturer's state of
knowledge or culpable ignorance is irrelevant, it little advances our
perception of critical questions concerning product liability to discuss a question in terms of the manufacturer's state of mind. Justice Larsen considers the matter of adequacy of warning in the
context of the interplay between product and consumer, putting
aside the perceptions of the manufacturer. 41 His language expresses the approach better than any attempted rephrasing:
[C]onfusion can perhaps be avoided if one conceptualizes the product itself
as the "defendant" in the case. Within this framework, the trial court
should direct the jury's attention to the "invitational aspect" of the product, that is, those characteristics, both apparent physical properties as well
as externalities such as marketing, promotional activities, labels, logo, prior
use of similar items, etc., that combine to evoke a particular image of the
product in the mind of the consumer as to the product's function, its capabilities, the risks inherent in its use, and its limitations. The popular perceptions in the marketplace cannot be divorced from the product . . . . A
product thus "speaks" to society through its "invitational aspect", as ascertained both by its apparent physical properties and by various (and varying) external factors. Such an approach relegates the role of the manufacturer's conduct and other negligence concepts to the insignificance
consistent with strict product liability, and elevates to requisite prominence
the pivotal interplay between product and users (society).
The instant case amply illustrates the necessity of knowing a product's
extrinsic characteristics in order to assess the adequacy of warnings, and to
determine whether a defect exists for lack of adequate warnings. The strict
39. 450 A.2d at 623 (Larsen, J., dissenting).
40. Wade, supra note 3, at 839-40; Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of
Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30, 37-38 (1973).
41. 450 A.2d at 633-34 (Larsen, J., dissenting).
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liability theory advanced at trial was that the Power King was defectively
designed for the market in which it was placed because, in that market
Daisy BB-guns, through the labels and logos attached to and associated
with them, conveyed a certain image as play guns that were relatively safe
for use by children, and by introducing the Power King on that market
without warnings adequate to inform the user that this gun was unlike
those other BB-guns with their image of safety, (i.e., in effect, the Power
King was mislabeled) it was in a defective condition which condition caused
James Sherk's death. In attempting to introduce evidence of external factors, the plaintiff-appellee was merely endeavoring to prove one of the characteristics of the Power King, its "invitational aspect".
If the jury was to have properly evaulated the adequacy of the warnings
given, they had to have been fully apprised of the seriousness of the danger-the hidden danger of death inherent in a gun such as the Power King
placed on the traditional gun market. That danger could only be comprehended by a knowledge of the image projected by other Daisy BB-guns in
order to appreciate "how much warning is adequate?".
There emerges in the instant case, the reality that the use of the logo
"Daisy" with the Power King is of paramount significance in the public
mind in that it creates popular expectations as to how the gun will operate
(as a play gun), by whom it will be used (children), and with what probable
results (bruises, stings, or at worst, a lost eye). The Power King accompanied by the Daisy logo "invites" use by a young boy in a manner substantially the same as the use "invited" by traditional Daisy BB-guns, despite
the expectations or the use "intended" by the manufacturer. In effect, it
"speaks" to prospective purchasers saying "Use me as a BB-gun-I can hurt
but not kill", regardless of warnings that it may be more powerful."'

This approach represents the ideal in strict product liability law.
It excludes from the assessment of relevant factors the intention of
the manufacture and includes the conduct of the manufacturer
only to the extent that it is manifested in the finished product.
The product is recognized as having anthropomorphic characteristics by virtue of its physical attributes, and identification with
other products which have performed in a certain way (logos, product name, mode of advertisement). If the fact-finder is directed to
make its determination in the context of consumer perception of
product communication, non-verbal more often than verbal, we
shall happily have eliminated from the picture manufacturer's conduct. Moreover, we shall have substituted as the determinative factor in products cases the very relationship which Justice Traynor
first referred to in Escola:
The consumer no longer has means or skill enough to investigate for himself
the soundness of a product, even when it is not contained in a sealed package, and his erstwhile vigilance has been lulled by the steady efforts of man42. Id. (citation and footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
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ufacturers to build up confidence by advertising and marketing devices such
as trademarks. Consumers no longer approach products warily but accept
them on faith, relying on the reputation of the manufacturer or the
4
trademark. 3

In using the "invitational aspect" 44 as the thematic premise we recognize the actual relationship which is meaningful, and we do so in
a manner which excludes the extraneous elements of manufacturer's intentions, conduct, or observance of a standard of care. We
employ no legal fiction, and we respond to the call of the public
policy considerations enunciated 40 years ago.
In concusion, if the plurality opinion in Sherk confirms fears
that under Pennsylvania strict product liability law the defense of
misuse is expanded to the point where the manufacturer is given
virtual carte blanche to define the parameters of its liability, we
have an accompanying dissent which serves as a beacon to illumine
the appropriate focus of a products liability case. That dissent invites our serious consideration.

43. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling, 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436, 443 (1944), (citations
omitted).
44. 450 A.2d at 633 (Larsen, J., dissenting).

